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Revealing Technology’s Role in Warfare
In The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and the Making of Modern
America, William G. Thomas has deployed the latest technological tools of the
early twenty-first century, those of digital history, to provide a nuanced and
thought-provoking treatment of the most momentous technological development
of the nineteenth century, the railroad. As the founding director of the Virginia
Center for Digital History, he is well-suited to the task of applying the analytical
tools of the digital age to examine the documentary record and elucidate the true
complexity of the past. To this end, The Iron Way investigates the
complementary and interrelated roles of the railroads and the Civil War in the
creation of modern American society. His notion of modernity, however, is one
in which contemporary Americans came to think of themselves as modern, as
distinctly different from those who preceded them in earlier eras—different in
their ability to move through space, different in their relationship with new
technologies, and different in their ability to control and advance progress.
Thomas breaks his book into three parts. The first of these, “Tools," is
devoted to the rise of the railroad in both sections of the country during the
decade preceding the Civil War. In the South the new technology knit the
disparate region into a coherent whole and worked to solidify and expand slavery
as railroad companies bought or leased large numbers of slaves. In the North the
railroad companies provided the foundation for a rapid expansion westward of
the region’s free labor society, putting northern society into direct competition
with the ongoing expansion of the southern slave society. And in both sections,
as Thomas points out elsewhere, Americans identified the railroad with progress
and modernity, a tool for advancing their own version of American civilization,
whether slave or free.
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Next, the author turns to the intersection of war and technology in his book’s
second part, “Leviathan." Here, in five chapters that compose the bulk of the
book, Thomas investigates the relationship between the Civil War and the
railroads as well as their combined effect on American society. He begins this
section by examining the role played by railroads in the coming of the secession
crisis and the war’s early months. He continues (in several chapters) with a
discussion of how railroads influenced the war as commanders came to terms
with the new technology and common soldiers and citizens alike experienced the
conflict along the iron ways of the South. He pays particular attention to how
what he calls the “South’s second nature systems of rail, bridge, depot, and
junction," slowly became the focus of Union military operations and gave the
war its particular geographic focus (88). Thomas also traces how the areas of
operation around the railroad lines, his so-called “railroad war zones," became
centers of irregular warfare and African-American freedom. Since the southern
railways were symbols of unification and modernity, their breakdown under the
stresses of war marked the slow isolation and decline of the Confederacy, a
process that accelerated late in the war with the rise of what Thomas dubs the
“railroad strategy" of Ulysses Grant, William Sherman, and Philip Sheridan. In
his final chapter on the war itself, Thomas describes how these three Union
commanders, Sherman in particular, attempted to assert control over the
Confederacy, its people, its landscape, and its second nature systems by
following and controlling the railways.
In the third part of his book, “Vortex," Thomas devotes a single chapter to
the postwar years. Here he examines the connections between the railroads and
freedom for African Americans after emancipation. Railroads expanded the
personal mobility of the freedpeople as they searched for distant loved ones
separated from them by slavery, railroads provided work for many former slaves,
and most importantly, they provided a contested space where the meaning and
limits of black freedom were hashed out by conflicts between whites and blacks
that established the parameters of postwar discrimination.
Thomas concludes his study with a brief epilogue covering the completion
of the transcontinental railroad and its celebration. Here he returns to what is a
frequent theme throughout the book: the modernity wrought by the railroads and
the war. Together these two developments helped convince Americans that,
through large and complex institutions wielding new technologies, nature could
be conquered and made to serve human design.
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In some ways, Thomas’s book is an example of the best in historical
scholarship today. It is an intriguing and thought-provoking book that enhances
the current understanding of how modern America developed. Thomas has
provided a subtle argument about the myriad complex social changes that can be
driven by a new technology, the way it was used, and the way it was understood
by those who used it. The Iron Way, however, is not without its flaws. There are
some minor issues with the accompanying tables, which are located in an
appendix at the back of the book rather than within the text where they are
referenced. In a couple of instances, the tables do not display their data in such a
way to support the points made in the text. For instance, on page 26, Thomas
claims that “The two regions, the South and the Northwest, shared equally in the
claims of vast progress" in railroad construction during the 1850s, and then he
references Table 1. While the veracity of his statement is not in doubt, the table
in question only compares railroad construction in the South and the entire
North, with no accompanying breakdown for the Northwest. Presumably, the
data could have been broken down to fully support the claim made in the text.
Similarly, when discussing George McClellan’s failure to grasp the importance
of railroads during his 1862 Peninsular Campaign, Thomas notes that “‘railroad’
terms faded into almost total disuse" as the campaign progressed and then
references Table 8 (91). This table, however, does not track the usage of railroad
terms throughout the Peninsular Campaign; instead it compares the usage of
these terms by Union officers in 1862 with that of 1864. But these problems
appear to be only the result of how the data is presented, and as such they are
only minor concerns.
Of greater import, but also more understandable given the book’s focus, is 
what appears to be an occasional overemphasis on the significance and effect of 
the railroads. For instance, Thomas contends that the railroad war zones 
“witnessed new forms of violence in the desperate partisan resistance of the 
Confederates" (108). While Thomas is correct in his claim that the railroads 
became the location and targets of violence that was often outside the accepted 
usages of war in the mid-nineteenth century, this kind of partisan warfare itself 
was hardly new at the time of the American Civil War. Likewise, Thomas’s 
discussion of Sherman’s marches and Philip Sheridan’s 1864 Valley Campaign 
seem to be skewed by his focus on the railroads. He argues that Sherman’s goal 
on his marches was to destroy and then control the Confederacy’s interior 
railroads, which were symbols of southern progress and modernity, but for 
Sherman the railroads were more a means to an end. He sought, first and
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foremost, to undermine the southern commitment to the war by showing
southerners that their government could not protect them while simultaneously
depriving the Confederacy of the means necessary to prosecute the war. In that
context, railroads were no more important than the military supplies or
agricultural goods that Sherman’s men either destroyed or consumed. At the
same time, Thomas’s characterization of Sheridan in 1864 as “seeking to raze
hundreds of square miles in the Shenandoah Valley and capture its railroads," is
directly at odds with the findings of historian Mark E. Neely, Jr., who
demonstrates that the primary Union objective in that campaign was the defeat of
Jubal Early’s Confederate army (Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Civil Wear and the
Limits of Destruction, Harvard University Press, 2007) (152). Thomas’s
mischaracterization of this campaign is particularly peculiar when one considers
that in his reassessment of this campaign on page 110 of his book, Neely
specifically lauded Thomas for pioneering a more accurate interpretation of
Sheridan’s operations in the valley with his essay in The Shenandoah Valley
Campaign of 1864 edited by Gary W. Gallagher (University of North Carolina
Press, 2006). These flaws, however, may only represent differences of emphasis
or interpretation and as such they do not detract considerably from the book’s
overall contribution.
In sum, William G. Thomas’s The Iron Way asks penetrating questions and
provides provocative answers about the role played by the railroads in the rise of
a modern America. Not all will agree with his conclusions, but every historian of
America interested in the Civil War or the years afterwards should be conversant
with them.
Mark A. Smith is an associate professor of history at Fort Valley State
University in central Georgia. His book, Engineering Security: The Corps of
Engineers and Third System Defense Policy, 1815-1861 (University of Alabama
Press, 2009), examines the national defense policy developed and implemented
by the Corps of Engineers between the War of 1812 and the Civil War. He is
currently in the preliminary stages of a study of Joseph Gilbert Totten, Chief
Engineer from 1838 until 1864.
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